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Abstract Colleges and universities already contribute significantly to the fight against
climate change, but the UN has recently called upon them to do even more. The purpose
of this article is to demonstrate that institutions of higher education play a unique role in
combatting climate change and other structural injustices, not only by conducting
research and disseminating knowledge, but also by fostering a form of collective political
responsibility. A philosophical analysis of different forms of collective responsibility,
with specific attention to the Fossil Free divestment movement, reveals how social
position facilitates this contribution more so in colleges than in other institutions.
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I. Introduction
Colleges and universities1 already contribute significantly to the fight against climate
change. Researchers from a wide range of disciplines identify causes, effects, and
possible solutions to the challenges posed by a warming planet. Scholars share the
knowledge gained through such work with each other, their students, and the public. Yet
the United Nations (UN) has called upon colleges to do even more.
The 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris reached a monumental global
commitment of 195 nations to tackle climate change. Article 12 of this Paris agreement
explicitly states:
Parties shall cooperate in taking measures, as appropriate, to enhance climate change
education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to
information, recognizing the importance of these steps with respect to enhancing
actions under this Agreement (UNFCC 2015).
1
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Throughout this article, these two words will be used interchangeably.
Perhaps Basken’s focus on the hard sciences is too limited. Other fields, such as philosophy, may
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This charge is not new. The UN created the Higher Education Sustainability Initiative
(HESI) in anticipation of COP 20. HESI also called for improvements in teaching,
research, engagement, local efforts at universities, and information sharing (Sustainable
Development.org). And in fact, an appeal to educational institutions can be found as far
back as “Our Common Future,” the report that led to the establishment of the first Earth
Summit in Rio 1992 (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987).
Universities are the world’s best centers for research and knowledge production. Why do
so many external to academia deem it necessary to encourage them to contribute more to
fighting one of the gravest challenges? Shouldn’t internal motivation drive such research?
Perhaps structural limitations within academia itself discourage this work. Scholars
lack incentive to conduct serious research on the deeper social roots of climate change –
for instance, research on the political implication of climate science or corporate
influence on public opinion – since this type of work is more difficult to publish than
research represented with quantitative modeling (Basken 2016).2 The call for greater
action may aim to deconstruct these limitations, and to open up new venues and
incentives for such research. However, the possibilities for how colleges can engage with
these issues is not exhausted by research, publishing, information sharing, teaching, and
community outreach. Colleges offer fertile grounds for activist movements.
Recently over 800 independently operated chapters of the Fossil Free divestment
movement have sprung up across the world, many on college campuses (FossilFree.org).
Students, faculty, staff, and community members have launched campaigns to rid
endowments of fossil fuel holdings. Some demonstrations, involving sit-ins, protests,
arrests, and more have received a great deal of attention in the press. At COP 21 the
Fossil Free campaign announced over $3.4 trillion had been divested (350.org), and this
number has continued to grow.
Institutes of higher learning have long been a center for many movements; for
instance, civil rights, anti-capitalism, anti-war, apartheid, and anti-sweatshop. Recently,
they have turned their attention to issues such as police violence and fossil fuel holdings.
These issues all have something in common: the individual college or institution cannot
improve much by acting on its own. In other words, these issues invoke collective
responsibility – a philosophically contentious subject – because they arise from collective
action. Such problems require a collective rather than a private response since they do not
arise from individual behavior, but from the social structures that influence such
behavior. The response to collective action problems must be collective since no one
agent has the power to transform structures in isolation. But why are college campuses so
often at the epicenter of movements involving structural injustice?
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that institutions of higher education play
a unique role in combatting climate and other structural injustices, not only by conducting
research and disseminating knowledge, but also by fostering a form of collective political
responsibility. A philosophical analysis of different forms of collective responsibility,
with specific attention to the Fossil Free divestment movement, reveals how social
2
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position facilitates this contribution more so in colleges than in other institutions. Section
II examines three mutually reinforcing methods for understanding collective
responsibility. Section III assesses these methods alongside climate change, a collective
action problem that requires a political form of responsibility. Section IV argues that the
fossil fuel divestment movement illustrates how colleges can leverage their unique social
position to meet this responsibility. Section V concludes that college communities can do
more to combat climate change by helping to foster this kind of activity on their
campuses.

II. Three Approaches to Collective Responsibility
Most recognize that climate change demands a form of collective responsibility, but such
a demand presents many philosophical difficulties. 3 First, collective responsibility
challenges principles of justice. That climate change is harmful is no longer so
controversial as who is responsible for its harms. While most agree obligations should fall
upon state agents, identifying these state agents among others has been a contentious
issue (Brown 1998; Caney 2010; Gardiner 2011; Maniates 2001; Shue 1993; Traxler
2002). Candidates include, for example, those with the most historical emissions (Brown
1998; Caney 2010; Schüssler 2011), those who can reduce emissions in the most costeffective manner (Posner and Weisbach 2010), or those who exceed equal per capita
emission allowances (Singer 2002). Second, according to many climate experts, states are
not acting quickly enough.4 Therefore, many question whether responsibilities fall upon
other agents, such as local governments, corporations, other institutions, or even
individual citizens. Such responsibilities may be direct, meaning agents should take
actions to reduce their own emissions; or they may be indirect, meaning agents should
pressure governments, which have more power to effect meaningful reductions through
regulations and transnational agreements.
The scope of this paper includes neither principles of justly distributed cleanup
burdens, nor the question of direct or indirect duties, but a more primary set of concerns:
what is the nature of shared collective responsibility? There are at least two reasons to
examine this question. First, the form of responsibility limits the shape its content might
take; for instance, whether duties can even be direct or indirect, since form determines
what kinds of collective agents are involved (i.e., whether responsibility is shared among
collective agents). Since state agents are not acting quickly enough, this question
becomes particularly important. Second, understanding the nature of collective
responsibility will help identify the qualities colleges possess as collective agents that
enable such responsibility, qualities that other institutions lack. Identifying this nature
will help reveal how colleges are in a unique position to address climate change.
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A number of problems arise with the concept of collective responsibility itself; however, they will not
be discussed here. This paper assumes some form of collective responsibility is necessary to combat
climate change; the present task is to determine the nature of this responsibility.
4
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Philosophers have adopted at least three different general methods for describing the
structure of collective responsibility and how it arises. Each of these methods is outlined
below. The next section will assess each method in light of climate change.5
Group agency and individual agency
The first approach examines the possibility and constitution of group agency. Presuming
only agents can be morally responsible, collective responsibility must belong to collective
agents. Many philosophers have outlined the criteria for collective agency. For the most
part, these criteria mirror those for individual agency. Individual agents constitute a group
agent when they share some combination of intentions, desires, and deliberative decisionmaking procedures (Gilbert 1992; List and Pettit 2011; Tuomela 2013). Collectives
organized enough to possess collective responsibility are often referred to as “groups” to
distinguish them from a “mere collective” of agents.
The concept of group agency is useful for several reasons. First, certain kinds of
actions can only be taken by groups; for instance, a crowd at a sporting event performing
the wave, or a team winning a football game. The wave cannot be performed alone just as
a single player cannot win a game on her own (Isaacs 2011, p. 34). Second, group agency
helps describe how people speak and feel about collectives such as political parties or
companies as extra-individual entities (Held 1970, p. 471–472). People say they
disapprove of a political party’s stance on an important social issue, or they are angry
with BP for failing to implement an effective plan to stop a leaking oil rig. Finally, group
agency helps avoid a “deficit of responsibility,” which may arise when no individual
agent is responsible (List & Pettit 2011, p. 165). Companies can be penalized legally or
morally (e.g., incur fines or blame) even when no single person can be found guilty of
breaking a law.
Practical reasons for holding responsible
The second approach questions the practical reasons for holding collectives responsible
even when they fail to exhibit features of agency. This approach captures the idea that
individual agents are able to, often do, and most importantly should band together to
solve collective action problems. For instance, onlookers should work together to save a
drowning swimmer in turbulent waters, perhaps by forming a human chain. A mere
collective, even of random agents, has a responsibility to organize action when the result
is favorable to doing nothing (e.g., letting the swimmer drown), and when the required
action is “obvious to the reasonable person” (Held 1970, p. 476).
The same responsibility applies to established organizations that lack the prerequisites
for group agency discussed above – for instance, decision-making procedures. As with
small children, holding collectives responsible when they do not display the full signs of
moral agency can be instructive and can even encourage them to develop such capacities
(List and Pettit 2011, pp. 157 & 193). Moral disapproval can encourage a company to
develop proper offices and procedures for dealing with harms they may cause. Thus not
just agency, but the potential for agency gives rise to responsibility.
Social connection and structural injustice
5
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The third approach grounds collective responsibility in neither collective agency nor its
possibility alone, but in social position, or connection within a network of agency and
collective projects that presume the interaction of many different agents (Young 2011).
This form of responsibility is ideal for addressing what Young calls “structural injustice”:
Structural injustice…exists when social processes put large groups of persons under
systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise
their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to dominate or to
have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising capacities available
to them. (p. 52)
The uncoordinated routine activities of many agents reproduce structural injustices; they
are “a consequence of many individuals and institutions acting to pursue their particular
goals and interests, for the most part within the limits of accepted rules and norms”
(Young 2011, p. 52).
Climate change is a form of structural injustice. First, it results from routine,
seemingly harmless activities in the domestic and economic spheres: e.g., travel,
production, and investment. Second, climate change certainly puts large groups of people
“under systematic threat of domination or deprivation” while also benefiting others.
Those who have contributed least to climate change – the world’s poor and those yet to
be born – stand to suffer its worst consequences. The world’s affluent also stands to
benefit most from the conveniences of fossil fuel use – industrial production, and cheap
transportation and energy. The world’s poor are most vulnerable, facing droughts,
famine, water shortages, rising sea levels, floods, and storms all with fewer resources to
mitigate their effects. Finally, the world’s affluent have become so in part because of
their unrestricted ability to pollute the atmosphere with greenhouse gases, a byproduct of
economic activity and growth.6
Structural harm differs qualitatively from harm that arises from individual actors
(Young 2011, p. 44); even individual group agents. For instance, investigative journalists
revealed that Exxon knew about the link between fossil fuels and climate change since at
least 1977 (Banerjee, Song, and Hasemyer 2015). In this case, each individual member of
Exxon may be guilty if she actively misled the public about how fossil fuels cause
climate change. However, sometimes focus on individual offending agents alone is
unhelpful. If one fails to question the structural factors that encourage “bad” behavior,
then “bad” individual actions appear as anomalies rather than predictable byproducts.
Indeed, a number of other energy companies shared information about the connection
between fossil fuels and climate change (Banerjee 2015). Rather, preventing structural
harm requires examining the various social structures that encourage or enable individual
agents to cause it. How did so many multinational corporations actively mislead the
public about their destructive practices in the pursuit of greater profits? Fossil fuel
companies have a strong incentive to deny a link between their product and harm. The
same was true of tobacco companies when smoking was linked to cancer. In fact, fossil
fuel and tobacco companies confused the public about these links by using similar
methods (Oreskes and Conway 2010).

6
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Social connection responsibility is different from other forms of collective and
individual responsibility in the following senses. First, responsibility for structural
injustice corresponds to “social position,” or place of privilege or disadvantage the agent
occupies relative to other agents, institutions, and social processes (Young 2011, p. 56).
Second, this responsibility is neither collective nor individual, but shared;7 social position
determines how it is shared. Finally, this responsibility aims to transform unjust
structures, not hold individuals accountable for “bad” action, so it is met through
collective action (Young 2011, p. 111). Agents are morally responsible because they
participate in processes that lead to unjust outcomes. However, this responsibility is more
than complicity in harm (Kutz 2007), since one does not meet it by withdrawing
participation. Rather, meeting social connection responsibility requires examining one’s
social position and acting with others to transform unjust structures. In other words, this
is a forward-looking, political form of responsibility as opposed to a retrospective,
individualized form (Young 2011, pp. 105–112).

III. Assessing Methods
This section examines each of the above three models alongside climate change as a form
of structural injustice. Each model offers some insight into why universities have
responsibilities to address climate change; however, the social connection model explains
the role that the social position of colleges plays in giving a unique shape to these
responsibilities relative to other institutions.
Isolated agents?
Most universities qualify as group agents. As such, they are appropriate subjects of
collective responsibility according to the group agent approach. Failure to address
responsibilities may warrant condemnation, blame, shame, or other responses from the
public. However, this approach tends to individualize responsibility.
For instance, philosophers disagree over whether or how collective responsibility
distributes among group members (Cooper 1968; Feinberg 1968; List and Pettit 2011;
May 1998; Young 2011), though most agree “judgments assessed on members of the
collectivity do not follow necessarily from judgments of collective blame” (French 1998,
p. 25). In other words, an employee of ExxonMobil cannot apologize on behalf of the
company for lying about its decades-long awareness of the connection between fossil
fuels and global warming unless she is authorized to do so (List and Pettit 2001, p. 35–
36). Likewise a citizen cannot apologize on behalf of his state for failing to ratify an
international climate treaty. Group agency itself says nothing of how responsibility
disseminates among agents: among group members, between group agents, and between
members and non-members. Group agency concentrates responsibility within atomized
agents (groups or individuals); by doing so, it isolates agency and fails to explain how
sharing responsibility for climate change is possible.
Yet since climate change is a form of structural injustice, individuals, group agents,
and states all need to cooperate to avert further harmful climate change. One college
divesting of fossil fuels may make headlines, but will not affect much on its own.
Furthermore, if only the actions or inactions of individual agents are considered, then the
7
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significance of such actions is lost in the vast sea of many other acting agents. Perhaps
such actions have communicative power – may encourage others to act (Hourdequin
2011) – but not necessarily. Responsibility for structural injustice must be shared among
agents.
Obvious and reasonable?
The second approach addresses some of the issues discussed above. First, it accords with
moral intuitions about the obligation to solve problems by working together, constructing
new group agents, even spur of the moment, when doing so produces morally preferable
outcomes. This approach also encourages agents to further develop capacities to address
new moral situations. The first step many schools take when considering divestment is to
assemble a working group or committee to assess investments. While committees on
socially responsible investment and sustainability have been common features of
contemporary universities, new issues such as climate change and divestment strengthen
interest in them.
However this approach becomes difficult when we consider problems on a global
scale. The “obvious and reasonable” criteria may be clear in the case of a drowning
swimmer, but as problems become more complex so do solutions. Agents should act with
others to form new groups, but with whom they should be acting is unclear. Social
connection adds to the practical reasons approach by giving agents parameters of
reasoning about their action corresponding to social position.
Connected how?
The social connection approach holds that agents share a responsibility relative to their
social position within the structures that lead to a warming climate. Like the practical
reasons approach, this responsibility may entail developing new groups and structures. It
may also ask group agents to draw from their position. But both the subject and content
of responsibility – who must do what? – is still quite vague. To combat this, Young
(2011) suggests four parameters by which to locate and distribute responsibility based on
an agent's position within the network: privilege, collective ability, interest, and power
(pp. 142–151). The next section examines how these parameters describe the social
positions of universities, and how the fossil fuel divestment movement illustrates a form
of this political responsibility by leveraging social position to influence change.

IV. Social Connection Responsibility on College Campuses
Because universities occupy similar social positions relative to one another, and because
they are able to draw upon similar resources afforded by their social position, universities
are candidates for sharing responsibility. Below each parameter is examined with
reference to the divestment movement.
Privilege
Endowment-holding institutions reap profits from harmful investments, yet as institutions
they avoid the terrible consequences, such as suffering and death, which befall actual
people. This places them in a relative position of privilege. By forgoing this privilege,
colleges prove such holdings unnecessary for financial health. Structural injustice arises
from the routine (in this case, stockholding). Many think it immoral to benefit from the
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harms of others. Divesting colleges uphold this principle when they surrender their
privilege to draw benefits from fossil fuel investments. Social connection responsibility
requires forfeiting this privilege in order to challenge the presumption that any agent
should benefit from harmful practices. Sharing responsibility entails encouraging others
to divest as well. Colleges send a public message to other colleges and stockholders when
they join the Fossil Free movement: that they believe divestment is both possible and
good.
Collective ability
The divestment movement targets all endowed institutions, which explains why many
non-profit and government institutions are also involved. However, colleges are unique in
their collective ability. Their decision-making mechanisms, more so than other
institutions, often encourage the entire community to participate democratically in issues
of governance. Student and faculty governing bodies are often represented at various
levels of the institution, even at the board level. These bodies hold decision-makers
accountable. They create new directives and committees, such as socially responsible
investment committees. It has not been uncommon for board members, students, faculty,
and staff to work together on divesting campuses. Compare this structure with that found
in the corporate or political world. Employees often cannot criticize their superiors
without fear of reprisal or loss of employment. Colleges also care a great deal about
community development, ensuring that all students have both a place and a voice in the
affairs of the community.8
Interest
“Sometimes agents’ interests coincide with the responsibility for justice” (Young 2011, p.
145). Colleges declare their purpose or interest through mission statements. These
statements often make reference to increasing public welfare, benefiting society on a
national and a global scale, improving the world for future generations, etc.; and more
recently, colleges have pledged an interest in sustainability. Many Fossil Free chapters
have leveraged their university’s mission statements in their arguments to divest. It is
difficult to commit to future welfare while engaging in practices that work against it.
Finally, colleges have an interest in the truth. The links between burning fossil fuels and
climate change, and between profitability and shareholder support, are undeniable.
Power
Both individual agents within colleges and colleges as collective agents themselves
possess unique powers to affect unjust structures merely by provoking debates about
them. An organized student group has a great deal of power to influence its university’s
decision-making processes. First, unlike employees at other institutions, students cannot
be fired. Second, students are stakeholders in the reputations of the college; their diploma
will bear its mark for their lifetime. Third, it reflects poorly on schools to expel students
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engaged in peaceful political demonstration. Tenured faculty may have similar power,
especially en masse.9
While students and faculty possess power within universities, universities themselves
hold external power to influence public discourse. Their reputation as centers of
knowledge and learning carries intellectual weight both within academia and in public
culture at large. Each additional divesting university amplifies the influence of the
movement. All endowment-holding universities have the power to divest. By exerting it,
they hope to influence the political and economic structures that enable climate change.

V. Conclusion
This paper began with the claim that universities should be doing more to meet their
collective responsibility to combat climate. Three different methods for describing
collective responsibility were examined. The social connection model builds upon the
group agent and practical reasons methods to highlight how responsibility arises, not in a
vacuum, but in a complex network of social relations. Since climate change is a structural
injustice, it too arises within a network of routine interactions. Meeting social connection
responsibility entails leveraging one’s position and working with other agents to
transform the structures that encourage climate change. It follows that colleges could
foster social connection responsibility in the form of campus discussion, activism, and
movement building.
Note this paper makes no claim that divestment is best method for addressing climate
change. This would require further studies. Rather, since climate change requires
collective political action, colleges can help develop the form of responsibility required to
spur positive social change by fostering these types of discussions and engaging with
climate movements such as Fossil Free.
Campuses have historically housed a number of movements exercising political
responsibility. Take for instance the South African divestment movement. The movement
against apartheid was not born of strategy, but dissatisfaction with the governing
structures that failed to adequately address injustice (Seidman 2015, p. 1017). Divestment
began as an act of moral hand-washing, a communicative act of disapproval. College
campuses played a significant role by provoking debates about the moral status of
maintaining economic ties to apartheid (Seidman 2015, p. 1023). The seat of the
movement's power was not the actual financial effect of divesting colleges, but the power
to question – to politicize and moralize – the economic structures that allowed institutions
to profit from apartheid. In other words, students and universities drew from their
position to leverage social change, change which was only possible by sharing
responsibility with other universities and institutions.
Laboratories and classrooms are therefore not the university’s only resources for
confronting climate change. Challenging structural injustice requires questioning the
routines that sustain harmful practices. This can be controversial. Colleges can encourage
members to engage in the necessary contentious debates, critical self-scrutiny, and
experimental reimagining of harmful commonplace habits – and they can pledge to
protect those members who do so. They can allow student and faculty representation in
decision-making processes and provide information about their investments and practices
9
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necessary for informed decisions. The university community itself can become a lab and
classroom, and colleges can lead the way instigating the cultural-political transformations
necessary for confronting climate change.
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